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MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION OF NEW YORK
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS: HISTORY OF
ENABLING LEGISLATION, 1776-1956
FRED FREEDLAND*
O N December 4, 1889 there was introduced in the United States Senate
a bill' destined to give its sponsor, Senator Sherman of Ohio, a place
in American history as enduring as that of another Sherman, whose
classic four-word description of war has undoubtedly assured him some
sort of immortality. For, whenever governmental restraints upon the
activities of business corporations in the United States are discussed, of-
ficially or academically, the usual point of departure is the Sherman Act2
-the subsequent enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 Clay-
ton Act' and other antitrust legislation 5 notwithstanding.
This situation is especially true of corporate activity involving the com-
bining of two or more business corporations, engaged in interstate com-
merce, into a single organization through the medium of merger or
consolidation-and understandably so. The Sherman Act, and more
particularly section 2 of the act,' is still the only substantive federal
* Member of New York Bar. Attorney, Department of the Army.
1. The bill was introduced under the title "A bill to declare unlawful trusts and com-
binations in restraint of trade and production." 21 Cong. Rec. 96 (1889).
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
3. Act of Congress approved Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 41-58 (Supp. 1955).
4. Act of Congress approved October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 13-27 (1951). The Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended by 52 Stat.
446 (1938), represents the most important amendment of the statute.
5. In a broad sense, legislation requiring the prior approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board and other regulatory agencies to the merger or con-
solidation of corporations under their jurisdiction, or to the establishment of specified inter-
corporate relationships on the part of such corporations, might be regarded as antitrust
legislation, a term which has long since become a misnomer. By way of example, see Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 488, 489 (1951); Communications Act of 1934
§ 222, 57 Stat. 6, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 222(b), (c), (d), (e) (1955) and, Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 § 5, 24 Stat. 380 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 5(2), (14) (1955).
There are also several statutes, designed to exempt certain business activities from the
operation of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act, which might
also be regarded as antitrust legislation. A relatively recent example is the McCarran Act
which, except for the boycott, coercion and intimidation provisions of the Sherman Act,
exempts insurance companies from the operation of these statutes to the extent antitrust
regulation was undertaken by the state prior to June 30, 1948. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as
amended by 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1013, 1015 (1948).
6. Section 1 of the act is directed toward restraints of trade by parties acting in concert.
Section 2 of the act is directed toward monopoly, whether resulting from unilateral or multi-
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legislation on monopoly and, unless made inoperative by immunity legis-
lation or other congressional action, the pertinent provisions of the statute
still "define" the monopolization status under the federal antitrust laws of
any proposed or completed merger or consolidation. 7
In a very real sense, however, the law on the subject of monopoly has
not been provided by the Sherman Act but, of necessity, by the United
States Supreme Court in interpreting the meaning of the word "monopo-
lize" in the extremely abbreviated statutory text." In the course of in-
terpretation, the Court has rejected the literal definition as well as the
historic legal conception of a monopoly,' and has made reason and morality
the essential criteria for distinguishing between monopolistic and non-
monopolistic corporate combinations. 0 More recently, in indicating ap-
lateral action, and provides as follows: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both sid
punishments, in the discretion of the court." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1955).
7. Sections 2 and 7 of the original Clayton Act made unlawful certain specific behavior
(price discrimination and certain acquisitions of stock in another corporation or corporations)
which would have the effect of tending to create a monopoly. 33 Stat. 730, 731 (1914).
Inasmuch as any act which would tend to create a monopoly, including the act of stock
acquisition (see Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (104)), would pre-
sumably be unlawful under the unqualified language of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (fee
note 6 supra), the legislative enumeration of specific acts provided no substantive augmenta-
tion of the then existing statutory law of monopoly. Moreover, since 1914, alleged violations
of the Sherman Act have remained the basis for judicial determinations as to what con-
stitutes monopolizing. The Clayton Act, of course, did create an important new procedure
and forum for dealing with alleged monopolistic behavior.
The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the Anti-Merger Act of 1950, the major amend-
ments of the original Clayton Act, respectively spelled out types of prohibited prce dis-
crimination and placed acquisitions of corporate assets in the same category as stock acquisi-
tions but did nothing to spell out "monopoly." See 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended by 52
Stat. 446 (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1951); 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.A. § IS (1951).
The 1950 amendment, however, may eventually produce an ad hoc judicial definition of a
monopoly or a tendency to create a monopoly. See Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. on Antitrust
Laws 115-2S (1955).
S. See note 6 supra.
9. The literal definition of a monopoly is "to sell alone" or "exclusive sale". The concept
of aloneness or exclusiveness was preserved in the early English law of monopoly (as opposed
to the law of restraints on trade generally) wh:ch had its origin in the seventeenth century
and was directed toward the curtailment of exclusive rights and privileges to carry on desig-
nated business activities granted by authority of the crown. See Formoy, The Historical
Foundation of Modern Company Law 11-16 (1923).
10. It is not intended to present in this study a critique on the judicial interpretation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, it might be of some utility to indicate briefly that
the Supreme Court and other federal tribunals, in determining whether any proposcd or com-
pleted combination of business corporations will be or is a monopoly (i.e. "monopolizer"),
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proval of the Alcoa case," the Court also seems to have acknowledged the
possibility of a monopoly being an economic state of being.'
have not based their conclusions on what economically "is" but on what economically Is
desirable.
The latter judgment-which is a moral judgment-has usually been based on the "rule of
reason." The rule was first enunciated as a dictum by Chief Justice White in a judicial set-
ting in which the monopolization and "restraint of trade" provisions of the Sherman Act
were completely assimilated. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49-70 (1911).
As formulated by the Chief Justice, the rule in substance made illegal only "undue" restriction
of competition or "undue" obstruction of trade, thereby opening a broad avenue for purely
subjective value judgments on the part of the tribunal. It is ironic that the dictum, which
was addressed to restraints of trade generally, has since been applied only infrequently in
cases involving restraints of trade other than monopolization. See United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) ; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) ; United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933). It is obvious, of course, that monopolization is a restraint of trade but, because of
the specific provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act regarding monopolization, the doc-
trinal development of the case law affecting the merger and consolidation of corporations has
been different from that affecting combinations in restraint of trade generally.
11. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The court
held that where a single corporate enterprise (including subsidiary producing corporations)
makes positive and successful efforts to organize, utilize and augment facilities under its con-
trol in such a way as to exclude competition from the market of the present and the future,
further efforts to exclude competition are not necessary to constitute monopolization within
the purview of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The holding was responsible for a new concept
of monopolization under the Sherman Act, which has been defined as "monopoly in the
economic sense-that is, power to fix prices or to exclude competition-plus a carefully limited
ingredient of purpose to use or preserve such power." Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. on Antitrust
Laws 43 (1955). This is an excellent statement of the extent to which the "Alcoa" tribunal
recognized a judicially defined monopoly as an economic monopoly under the Sherman Act
but a caveat is in order: a "monopoly" as well as "monopolization" still remains a judicially
defined concept under the Sherman Act and at any time may be distinguished from the eco-
nomic fact by the tribunal. In this regard, note Judge Hand's dictum in the "Alcoa" case to
the effect that entrepreneurs who obtained complete (100%) control of a market through
legitimate competitive effort or the peculiar nature of the consumer's market would be "mo-
nopolists by force of accident" and not guilty of monopolization. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). Prior to this decision, the economic power
of an entrepreneur to exclude competition, if not exercised, did not seem to constitute monopo-
lization. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) ; Harbeson, A
New Phase of the Antitrust Law, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 977 (1947) ; Handler, Industrial Mergers
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 179 (1932) (a comprehensive presentation of
the case law regarding monopolization prior to 1932 indicating the elusiveness of the judicial
rule).
12. The monopoly concept of the "Alcoa" case (supra note 11) was expressly approved
and adopted by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
813-15 (1946). The case has never been distinguished or qualified in pertinent subsequent
Supreme Court decisions and has been favorably cited in Times Picayune Pub. Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953) ; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153
(1951) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948). ("[A] vertically
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Be that as it may, the rationale of federal courts in deciding whether
a merger or consolidation of business corporations has created or will
create a monopoly has been limited to a determination and evaluation of
the effect of such action on competition in the judicially defined industry
or market.13 Mergers and consolidations involving corporations engaged
in productively unrelated14 business activities could not possibly affect
the competitive situation and, accordingly, would not be subject to regula-
tion under the monopolization provisions of the federal antitrust laws.
The United States is currently in a period of widespread mergers and
consolidations of productively unrelated business enterprises, commonly
described as conglomerate mergers or consolidations.'0 The holding com-
integrated enterprise, like other aggregates of business units will constitute monopoly which,
though unexercised, violates the Sherman Act provided a power to exclude competition is
coupled with a purpose or intent to do so."); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 10, I05-07
(1948).
By reason of an unfortunate procedural quirk, the "Alcoa" case could not be heard by the
Supreme Court. The Court, because of the disqualification of several justices, was unable to
provide the required statutory quorum and the three senior Circuit Judges sat as a statutory
court of final appeal. 36 Stat. 1152 (1911), 58 Stat. 272 (1944). Therefore, even in the
absence of subsequent approval by the Supreme Court, the decision would have had more
significance than the usual Court of Appeals decision.
13. In antitrust cases of the past several decades, "industry" and "market" have been
loosely used as synonymous terms, the latter being more commonly used in recent cass. The
difficulties inherent in classifying areas of modem business activity into more or le-s definitive
industries or markets constitute a formidable barrier to the regulation of relatively small
business corporations with concentrated activity in a small geographical area or relatively
large business corporations which are extensively engaged in multifaceted activities. The rele-
vant factors are not always ascertainable, even theoretically. Practically, such elementary
variables as the precise identity of the pertinent product (goods or services produced), the
geographical confines of the market of the producer or distributor, and the relevant scope
of the producer's integration of its industrial activities (vertical or horizontal) often elude
even qualitative delimitation. See Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. on Antitrust Laws 44-S (1955);
Hamilton And Associates, Price and Price Policies § 1 (1933); Chamberlin, The Theory
of Monopolistic Competition c. 4, 5 (1935); Macdonald, Product Competition in the Rele-
vant Market Under the Sherman Act, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (1954); Hale, Trust Disolutlon:
"Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 615 (1940); Note, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 5SO (1954).
14. I.e., enterprises engaged in business activities which are so disshnilar as to be incapable
of being integrated on either a horizontal or vertical basis.
15. These conglomerate combinations are undertaken ostensibly for the purpose of divers-
fying the business activities of the surviving corporation or constituent corporations. Not
infrequently, however, the dominant or exclusive motivation is that of utilizing the tax credits
of non-prospering corporations, increasing the size of corporate enterprises or increasing the
personal fortunes of the promoter(s) of the combination.
A recent example of such a combination is found in the consolidation of the Mfartin-Parry
Corporation (manufacturer of diverse metal products), Prosperity Company, Inc. (manu-
facturer of laundry and dry cleaning machines) and the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship
Company into the Ward Industries Corporation on March 16, 1956. loody, Industrials 2221
(1956).
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pany device is also being used extensively to obtain the practical effect
of merging such enterprises through the creation of parent, wholly-owned
subsidiary relationships.'
Unless one of the corporations involved in a proposed conglomerate
merger or consolidation is a banking, insurance or public utility corpora-
tion, the combination can take place and has been taking place with legal
impunity, regardless of the size of the surviving or newly formed corpora-
tion or the over-all scope of its economic activities. There are in the
United States today no effective legal restraints, in federal or state law,
upon the merger or consolidation of productively unrelated "industrial"
corporations.'
7
Whether the federal government will ever enact legislation to limit or
prohibit future combinations of productively unrelated enterprises or other
non-monopolistic combinations of American "industrial" corporations is
problematical. Far from problematical, however, is the prospect that the
states and other incorporating jurisdictions 8 will ever attempt to accom-
plish this objective by the universal repeal of all legislation authorizing cor-
porate mergers and consolidations. In fact, the very suggestion that ac-
tion for this purpose might be initiated by a single state legislature would
be considered preposterous in this industrialized age. Nonetheless, the
absence of such legislation would not be without precedent in the nation's
16. As a matter of fact, the device is more extensively used than outright merger or
consolidation. Inasmuch as the subsidiary corporation retains its corporate identity, these
acquisitions of corporate stock are not legally mergers and will not be so regarded for pur-
poses of this study. For a history of the legislation authorizing intercorporate stockholding
in New York State, see Freedland, History of Holding Company Legislation in New York
State: Some Doubts as to the "New Jersey First" Tradition, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 369
(1955).
A recent example of the holding company type of acquisition is represented by the
diversification activities of the Penn Texas Corporation since 1953. See Moody, Industrials
2603 (1956) ; Barrons, April 9, 1956, p 1.
17. Current federal antitrust laws are not designed to regulate the combining of such
corporate enterprises. There are still a few states which limit the combination of business
corporations (other than banking, insurance and public utility corporations) to the merger
or consolidation of corporations engaged in business of the same general character or of the
same or a similar nature. E.g. N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, c. 12, § 1; La. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, § 47
(1951). However, industrial corporations domiciled in these states which desired to particl-
pate in a conglomerate merger or consolidation-and decided it was worth the candle--
could reincorporate in a more benign jurisdiction which did not so limit corporate combina-
tions. E.g. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 86; Del. Code § 251 (1953). Consequently, as long as
there is one state or other incorporating jurisdiction which authorizes conglomerate combina-
tions, it cannot be said that prohibitory laws in other states can effectively restrain such
combinations.
18. Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are the only incorporating jurisdictions
among the states, territories and dependencies of the United States without some form of
legislation authorizing the merger or consolidation of business corporations.
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history. For, during a substantial part of our national existence, there
was no general enabling legislation in any state authorizing corporate
mergers or consolidations'--and even the combining of designated in-
dividual corporations into a single corporation by special act of the legis-
lature was decidedly out of the ordinary.
The historical development of &eneral legislation authorizing the mer-
ger and consolidation of New York business corporations, which will be
treated definitively in this study, is illustrative of the incapacity of most
American business corporations to combine resources and organizations
until well into the nineteenth century. For purposes of this study, en-
abling legislation will be defined as legislation of a general character
authorizing the combination of two or more business corporations into a
single corporation by way of merger or consolidation. Any unqualified
reference to "legislation," "enabling legislation", "combination" (etc.)
will relate exclusively to general legislation and to the combining of cor-
porations in this manner.
I. MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND THE VOLUNTARY SALE OF
CORPORATE ASSETS: BASIC LEGAL DISTINCTIONS
There are undoubtedly business situations in which the management
and shareholders of interested corporations may find that, for purposes
of achieving the desired economic result, it is of no consequence whether
a proposed transaction takes the form of a merger, consolidation or
voluntary 0 sale of all assets by one or more of the corporations, especially
when payment for the assets is made in the stock of the acquiring cor-
poration.2 1 In legal 'contemplation, however, there are and always have
been distinctions between the processes of corporate merger, corporate
consolidation and the disposal of the assets of one corporation to another
through the medium of sale.22
19. See Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey, Business and Politics, 1791-1375, 324
(1949) ; Dodd, American Corporations Until 1860, 206, 254-55, 263-69, 302, 321-22, 329-30,
332, 338, 341, 343 n.106, 346, 343-49, 447-48 (1954). Railroads appear to have been the
principal beneficiaries of the special legislation.
20. I.e., a sale freely made by representatives of a prospering corporation pursuant to
authorization by stockholders as opposed to a forced sale by representatives of a non-prosper-
ing corporation or a receiver, trustee, sheriff or other officer of the court.
21. On the other hand, the practical economic differences from the standpoint of creditors'
rights, tax benefits (etc.) may be very real in any particular business stuation. For some
undifferentiated statistics regarding mergers, consolidations and sales of corporate aszets during
the 1951-1954 period, see F.T.C., Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquistions 37-65
(1955).
22. For a discussion of the extent to which the distinction creates real pragmatic differ-
ences under modem statutes, see Hills, Consolidation by Sale of Assets and Distribution of
Shares, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 349 (1931); Amsler, Organic Changes in the Corporation: Amend-
1956-571
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The basic distinction between the latter and the other courses of action
is that merger and consolidation always imply a combining of corporate
organizations as well as corporate assets and necessarily result in the
automatic extinction of the corporate existence of one or all of the par-
ticipating corporations. On the other hand, under general corporation
laws, the corporate existence and identity of corporations participating
in the sale and purchase of all the assets of a corporation are in no wise
affected by the sale-although the disposing corporation may choose to
initiate dissolution proceedings immediately after the sale.24
There is also a fundamental legal distinction between the merger and
the consolidation of business corporations, notwithstanding the tendency
of some courts25 and legislatures (including New York legislatures)20 to
confuse or "merge" the two processes on occasion. In a merger, one
corporation retains its corporate existence and the other participating cor-
poration or corporations lose their corporate existence, being absorbed by
and becoming a part of the surviving corporation. In a consolidation, all
the participating corporations lose their corporate existence and become
constituents of a newly formed corporation. In the main, this classic dis-
ment, Merger and Consolidation, Sale of Assets, 4 Baylor L. Rev. 449 (1952) (Texas corpo-
ration law) ; Note, 28 Geo. L. 3. 92 (1939).
23. Under the provisions of special charters and early corporation acts, which required
the corporation to carry on a prescribed, specific type of business activity-usually within a
limited geographical area and for a stipulated maximum term-there is considerable doubt
whether the disposition of all corporate properties by some corporations might not result In
the termination of their corporate existence by operation of law. Cf. Cole v. Millerton Iron
Co., 133 N.Y. 164, 30 N.E. 847 (1892). More recent legislation would permit the corporate
shell to continue in existence indefinitely and to renew the same or other business activities
at any time.
Illustrative of the modem tendency is the metamorphosis of the ACF-Brill Company
in 1955 from a long standing manufacturer of street cars, buses and other vehicles to an
operator of food stores under the name of ACF-Wrigley Stores. Moody, Industrials 2272
(1956).
24. It has been held that a merger is not effected when seven corporations sell all their
assets to another corporation and complete dissolution shortly thereafter. Argenbright v.
Phoenix Finance Co., 187 AtI. 125 (Del. Ch. 1936).
25. See discussion in In re Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537, 540, 147 AtI. 606, 607 (1929);
Knapp v. Golden Cross, 121 Tenn. 212, 118 S.W. 390 (1908); Pingree v. Michigan Central
R.R., 118 Mich. 314, 76 N.W. 642 (1898).
26. E.g., N.Y. Laws 1884, c. 367, § 3 ("Said corporations agreed to be consolidated shall
be merged into the new corporation"); N.Y. Laws 1937, c. 359, §§ 1, 6, now N.Y. Stock
Corp. Law §§ 86, 91 (10); N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 882, § 480, now N.Y. Insurance Law § 480.
At least three states have discovered the error of their ways and have amended earlier legisla-
tion in order to accord belated statutory recognition to the distinction. See Ala. Acts 1919,
No. 744, at 1108; Ala. Acts 1955, No. 83, § 1; Ala. Code Ann. § 94 (1955 supp.); Conn. Pub.
Laws 1903, c. 194, § 75; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 701d (1937 supp.), § 5220 (1949); N.C.
Pub. Laws 1939, c. 5, § 1; N.C. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 270, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-165
(1950).
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tinction between the merger and consolidation forms of corporate com-
bination has been consistently recognized by the courts in language as
well as decision 7 and will be preserved in this study.
The legal distinctions between corporate merger, corporate consolida-
tion and the sale of all the assets of one corporation to another corpo-
ration do not represent mere niceties of procedure but are substantive in
nature, and the three processes cannot be interchanged by intercorporate
agreement or other intercorporate action.
H. THE COMMON LAW RULE: NEW "ofi AN
OTHER ACERicAN JURISDICTIONS
In New York and other American jurisdictions, business corporations
have never been able to combine legally without express legislative
authority, regardless of whether the corporations may have been engaged
in the same or completely dissimilar types of business activities or may
have been competing or non-competing enterprises.25 There is no in-
27. By way of example, see statement of court m In re Bergdorf's Will, 149 App. Div.
529, 532, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1012, 1014 (2d Dep't 1912):
"We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a
marked difference under our statutes between the consolidation and merger of two or more
corporations, and that upon consolidation a new corporation springs into eLxitence and the
prior corporations are dissolved and cease to exist... while under the statutes author-
izing a merger of corporations, one is continued without the formation of a new corporation
and the others are merged in it.... The Legislature must have been precumed to have
known these well-recognized distinctions and, by omitting any reference to con-olidation in
the Banking Law and providing merely for a merger of banking corporations, it must have
intended to preserve such distinctions. ... "
The decision, involving the legal right of the Guaranty Trust Company to act as executor
in lieu of the corporation which it absorbed, was sustained by the Court of Appeals, 205 N.Y.
309, 99 N.E. 714 (1912). See also Irvine v. New York Edison Co., 207 N.Y. 425, 101 N.E.
358 (1913).
28. American Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota & Northwest R.R., 157 I". 641, 42 N.E.
153 (1S95); Cole v. Mfilerton Iron Co., 133 N.Y. 164, 30 N.E. 847 (1S92); Lotham v.
Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & West. Ry., 38 Hun. 265 (N.Y. 1SS) ; 15 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 7043
(perm. ed.); Stevens, Corporations § 193 (2d ed. 1949); Ballantine, Corporations §
289 (2d ed. 1946); 8 Thompson, Corporations § 6020 (3d ed. 1927 and 1931 supp.).
In Oklahoma, prior to the enactment of legislation authorizing merger and consolidation, it
was held that the sale of all the assets of one banking corporation to another did not consti-
tute a merger or consolidation. In First State Bank v. Loch, 113 Okla. 30, 33, 237 Pac. CO5,
609 (1925), the court stated: "It is well settled that corporations can only consolidate when
authorized by law, and then in the manner provided by law. It is conceded that there is no
law in this state authorizing the consolidation of corporations, and even though some of the
parties to the transaction herein involved used the words 'consolidate', or 'consolidation,
same could have no legal effect. Under the law in this state a corporation can only be
eaxtinguished by the expiration of the term for which its charter was granted, or by dissolution
in the district court in the manner provided by law."
Some English cases indicate that a combining of corporate organizations, usually referred
1956-57]
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herent corporate power which would permit a business corporation to
acquire another business corporation, to be acquired by another business
corporation or to surrender its corporate existence in order to become
a constituent part of a newly formed corporation-even with the con-
sent of all interested stockholders. Within the limits of its corporate
charter or certificate, however, a corporation could acquire all the
assets of another corporation without statutory authorization 20  Occa-
sional references in decisions or literature to the consummation of common
law mergers or consolidations upon the unanimous approval of the in-
terested stockholders" are erroneous and are intended to describe a
"combining" of corporate assets in this manner rather than the combina-
tion of corporations (as corporations) resulting from a merger or con-
solidation. There are no "de facto" corporate mergers or consolidations. 1
Not only did business corporations lack the power of combination at
common law but even the power of the legislature to authorize mergers
or consolidations has been challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, on constitu-
tional grounds. From the beginning, pertinent statutes have required
to as an "amalgamation," can only be accomplished pursuant to legislative authorization.
The Great Northern Ry. v. Eastern Counties Ry., 9 Hare 306, 68 Eng. Rep. 520 (1851); The
East Anglian Ry. v. Eastern Counties Ry., 11 C.B. 775, 138 Eng. Rep. 680 (1851).
29. In New York and the majority of American jurisdictions, the common law rule re-
quired the unanimods consent of the stockholders of the disposing corporation to consummate
the sale. People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892); Abbot v. American Hard
Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.Y. 1861); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (1853); 6 Fletcher,
Cyc. Corp. § 2947 (perm. ed.); Ballantine, Corporations § 281 (2d ed. 1946). The view,
however, is not universally accepted and, in some states, a sale can be effected with the con-
sent of the holders of the majority of the stock. Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co.,
160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913); Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 AtLI. 1014
(1912). For a commentary on the state of authority and the merits of the conflicting rules,
see Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 335 (1917);
Note, 19 Va. L. Rev. 166 (1932).
30. See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Stockholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell
L.Q. 420 (1930). But see In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 277 Fed. 455, 457 (SD.
N.Y. 1921). For the common law rule governing the sale of corporate assets, see note 29
supra.
31. "It is not a sufficient answer to say that the transfer was rather formal than real,
because before its occurrence the Millerton Co., having the same stockholders and
officers, managed and conducted the business of the National Company before the transfer,
as well as after, and that what occurred was a practical consolidation. Companies may con-
solidate, but under the permission and safe-guards of the statute, all of which were dis-
regarded. . . Y Cole v. Millerton Iron Co., 133 N.Y. 164, 168, 30 N.E. 847, 848 (1892).
Cf. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 624, 24 N.E. 834, 840 (1890).
In 1932, however, the Delaware Supreme Court judicially legislated an ad hoc "de facto"
merger for the benefit of creditors. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 339, 168 AtLI. 87 (1932).
32. See Clearwater v. Meredith, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 25 (1863) (Indiana statute) ; Beechwood
Securities Corp. v. Associated Oil Co., 104 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1939) (California statute) ; Beloff
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E. 2d 561 (1949); Bingham v. Savings Invest-
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that the holders of at least the majority of the voting stock of the partici-
pating corporations consent to any proposed merger or consolidation. It
is still open to question whether a state legislature has the power, under
the "contract" or due process provisions of the federal constitution to
authorize such corporate action upon the consent of stockholders owning
less than a majority of the voting stock.33
Ill. NEw YORK ENABLING LEGISLATION: PRIOR TO 1890
Prior to March 22, 1811, the date of the first general incorporation
act35 in New York State, every business corporation was individually in-
ment & Trust Co., 101 NJ. Eq. 413, 13S AtL 659 (1927); Levy, Rights of Dlhenting
Stockholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell L.Q. 420 (1930) ; Dodd, DLenting Stock-
holders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. SSS-92, 733-37, 744-52
(1927).
33. CL rationale of court in Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 30D N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.
2d 561, 564 (1949): "It is the settled law of this State that under the exprezs reservation of
power therefor in our State Constitution ... 'the Legislature has the right at any time it sees fit
to alter, suspend and repeal the charters of corporations', ... that this constitutional provision is
part of the contract or charter of every New York corporation ... and that it authorizes the
Legislature to make appropriate non-confiscatory statutory provisions for mergers .... It is fully
as well settled that if the merger (or consolidation) is duly consummated in accordance with
the statutes, the remedy of appraisal and payment is the only one available to dissenting
shareholders, and that such dissenters on such an appraisal are entitled to receive fair and
full compensation for all their rights.... It is settled, too, that statutes authorizing mergers may
lawfully be applied even to corporations formed and stock acquired before their enactment.
In short, the merged corporation's shareholder has only one real right; to have the value of
his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his right to an appr al.... He has
no constitutional right to deliberate, consult or vote on the merger, to have prior notice
thereof or prior opportunity to object thereto. His disabilities in those respects are the
result of his status as a member of a minority, and any cure therefor is to be precribed by
the Legislature if it sees fit. In none of this do we see any deprivation of due proces-, or of
contract rights." (Citations omitted.) See also Dodd, op. ci. supra note 32 at 744-52.
34. In view of the frequent citation of New York Session Laws in this study, the prefix
"N.Y." will only be inserted before the initial citation of such laws in each paragraph, unlezs
further insertions are necessary for purposes of clarification. In instances where a sEeon law
is the substantive source of a current (1956) provision of the Consolidated Laws, such legis-
lation will be cited as "N.Y. Laws.. ., c... (etc.), now N.Y. Railroad (or other) Law
§ ... ." Inasmuch as this is an historical study, it is the statute representing the original
substantive source of the current provision which will be cited as the source legislation.
Technical repeals, supersedures and amendments of the source legislation, which are sub-
stantively immaterial for purposes of this study, will be disregarded. Therefore, the statute
cited will not necessarily be the literal replica or the most recent enactment of the current
provision.
35. N.Y. Laws 1S11, C. 67. The statute, which was applicable to the incorporation of
enterprises engaged in the manufacture of woolen, cotton, linen, glass and certain metal
products, may have been the first general incorporation statute in the United States. See
Dodd, The First Half Century of Statutory Regulation of Business Corporations in Mas--
chusetts, Harvard Legal Essays 67, n. 13 (1934). But cf. lass. Acts 1793, c. 59, approved
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corporated by special act of the legislature. Two hundred and sixty-three
enterprises were so incorporated before the enactment of the 1811 statute
and, by way of background, it might be noted that none of these corpora-
tions was granted the power of merger or consolidation 3 -- the only
combination activity predating the general act being the merger of the
Schoharie Creek North Bridge Company and the Charleston Turnpike
Company by direct legislative action.37
In addition to the 1811 statute, only two general incorporation acts 8
became law in New York before the adoption of the "self incorporation"
provisions of the state constitution in 1846,11 but by 1890, when a general
revision of New York statutory law was undertaken, the number had in-
creased to fifty-two. All of the statutes, with the exception of the Busi-
ness Corporations Act of 1875,40 were limited in scope to specific types of
business activities.
In spite of the proliferation of pre-1890 general incorporation acts,
however, the Banking Act of 1882 alone made provision for corporate
February 21, 1799 (creating a general incorporation act for aqueduct companies which
apparently could be operated for profit).
36. This conclusion is based upon an analysis undertaken by the writer in conjunction with
an unpublished study relating to the growth of New York business corporations.
37. N.Y. Laws 1807, c. 175, § 23. The corporations were "united" as "The President,
Directors and Company of the Canajohary and Charleston Turnpike Road". The statute
contained a statement to the effect that the consent of the interested stockholders had been
previously obtained.
38. N.Y. Laws 1814, 38th sess., c. 12 (privateering associations); Laws 1838, c. 260
(free banking act for commercial banks).
39. The new constitution adopted by the State of New York in 1846 not only permitted
business enterprises to be incorporated without recourse to the legislature in each instance but
established "self incorporation" (the process whereby a group of individuals incorporate
themselves in pursuance of a general incorporation statute) as the basic public policy of the
state. The constitution (N.Y. Const., art. VIII, § 1 (1946) ) provided as follows:
"Corporations may be formed under general laws; but shall not be created by special act,
except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the legislature, the
objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws. All general laws, and special
acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered from time to time or repealed."
These provisions have been retained intact to date. See N.Y. Const., art. X, § 1 (1955).
Theoretically, the legislature could so exercise its judgment as to grant special charters as
a matter of course, and thereby nullify the self-incorporation requirement. Moreover, in view
of a probable holding of the Court of Appeals that the judgment of the legislature ls not
subject to judicial review, such conduct might well be considered legal. People v. Bowen,
30 Barb. 24 (N.Y. 1859), aff'd, 21 N.Y. 517 (1860) (by implication). Practically, however,
self-imposed restraints, public opinion and the gubernatorial veto constituted effective forces
in frustrating any such policy.
40. N.Y. Laws 1875, c. 611, at 755. The statute included within its scope all business
activity except "banking, insurance, construction and operation of railroads or the aiding In
the construction thereof, and the business of savings banks, trust companies or corporations
intended to derive profit from the loan or use of money and safe deposit companies."
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combination. 41 Consequently, since no enabling provisions were con-
tained in the Revised Statutes of 1827-18284 or any amendments thereof,
all other legislation of the period authorizing combination took the form
of independent statutes.
New York business corporations were granted the power of combina-
tion on ten occasions during this period. For the most part, the enabling
legislation authorized combination by way of consolidation, the legis-
lature apparently reasoning that intercorporate action resulting in the
creation of a new corporation was more in keeping with a policy of self-
incorporation than the merging of one corporation into another.
The power of combination was first granted on April 6, 1849, when
self-incorporated turnpike corporations were authorized to consolidate0
No procedure was prescribed for effecting the consolidation and no pro-
vision was made for giving dissenting stockholders a right to redeem their
stock. The legislation, although the skimpiest in text and most inadequate
in substance of any general legislation authorizing combination ever
passed by a New York legislature, remained in effect without amendment
until repealed in 1890.
The next consolidation statute, enacted in 1867, was unquestionably
the most important enabling legislation of the pre-1890 period. The
statute authorized the consolidation of two or more corporations with the
same or similar corporate objects, organized under the General Manu-
facturing Act of 1848 as amended and extended, to carry on "one kind of
business" authorized by the act of incorporationA The latter legislation
had always included certain types of non-manufacturing companies
within its purview45 and by 1866 had been extended to "the formation of
41. N.Y. Laws 1882, c. 409, §§ 48-50.
42. N.Y. Rev. Stat., 1827-1828, pt. I, c. 18, tit. I (turnpike corporations), tit. II (moneyed
corporations), tit. III (all corporations), tit. IV (special provisions relating to certain corpo-
rations).
43. N.Y. Laws 1849, c. 250, § 8.
44. N.Y. Laws 1867. c. 960, §§ 1, 2, 7. The new corporation was given complete intra-
state freedom of operation and the power to carry on busincss outside of the state to the
same extent that such power may have been enjoyed by any of the constituent corporations.
The maximum capital of the new corporation was limited to the combined capital of the
constituent corporations. The statute was immaterially amended in 1377. Lavs 1877, c.
374, § 2.
45. See N.Y. Laws 1848, c. 40, at 54. The full title of the act was originally "An act to
authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical
purposes!'
Notwithstanding its broadly worded provisions, several decades and twenty-three piece-
meal amendments were required to permit the incorporation of the larger segment of ordinary
commercial enterprises under the act and ten additional amendments to permit the incorpo-
ration of certain other commercial enterprises carrying on operations which were not neces-
sarily confined to the county of their situs. See N.Y. Laws 1851, c. 14, at 16; Laws 1355, c.
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corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, chemical, agricul-
tural, horticultural, medical or curative, mercantile or commercial pur-
poses."4 In 1884, supplemental legislation was enacted which authorized
all domestic manufacturing corporations engaged in the same or similar
business activities, including specially chartered corporations, to con-
solidate and carry on any kind of business authorized in their corporate
charters or certificates.4T
Other legislation of the pre-1890 period granting New York business
corporations the power of consolidation was limited to non-competing
railroad corporations having continuous lines,48 domestic self-incorporated
301, at 516; Laws 1857, c. 262, at 549 (as supplemented by Laws 1883, c. 240, at 243) ; Laws
1863, c. 63, at 87; Laws 1864, c. 337, §§ 1, 3; Laws 1865, c. 234, at 378; Laws 1865, c. 307,
at 514; Laws 1866, c. 371, § 1; Laws 1866, c. 799, § 1 (as amended by Laws 1871, c .657, § 1) ;
Laws 1867, c. 248, § 1; Laws 1868, c. 781, at 1749; Laws 1869, c. 605, at 1443; Laws 1871,
c. 535, at 1130 (as supplemented by Laws 1881, c. 58, at 64, Laws 1881, c. 232, at 338, Laws
1881, c. 589, at 825) ; Laws 1871, c. 657, § 2; Laws 1872, c. 426, at 1015; Laws 1874, c. 149,
§ 1; Laws 1875, c. 113, at 100; Laws 1875, c. 365, at 351; Laws 1877, c. 374, § 1 (as supple-
mented by Laws 1880, c. 241, § 2); Laws 1879, c. 290, § 1; Laws 1880, c. 85, §§ 1, 5; Laws
1881, c. 650, at 891; Laws 1882, c. 273, § 1; Laws 1884, c. 267, at 331; Laws 1885, c. 84, at
192; Laws 1888, c. 313, at 542; Laws 1890, c. 508, at 913.
46. Early in 1866, the title of the act was amended to "An act to authorize the formation
of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical or chemical or other purposes." N.Y.
Laws 1866, c. 799, § 2. Later in 1866, the title was further and finally amended to read
"An act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical,
chemical, agricultural, horticultural, medical or curative, mercantile or commercial purposes."
Laws 1866, c. 838, § 1.
47. N.Y. Laws 1884, c. 367, §§ 1, 2, 7. The statute was in force concurrently with the
1867 legislation, cited supra note 44, and, with respect to self-incorporated manufacturing
corporations, represented an alternative statutory basis for consolidation. Excepting the more
limited application of the 1884 statute and differences as to maximum capital requirements,
the provisions of both enactments were virtually identical. The later legislation limited the
maximum capital of the new corporation to "the fair aggregate value of the property,
franchises and rights of the several companies thus to be consolidated."
48. N.Y. Laws 1869, c. 917, §§ 1, 2. The statute authorized the consolidation of domestic
corporations or domestic and foreign corporations "whenever two or more railroads of the
companies or corporations so to be consolidated shall form a continuous line of railroad with
each other, or by means of an intervening railroad bridge or ferry." Parallel and competing
lines were expressly denied such power. Id. § 9. Subsequently, it was provided that the
continuous line might be effected through the juncture of branch lines. Laws 1881, c. 685, at
921. Legislation was also enacted after 1869 authorizing the consolidation of domestic rail-
road corporations in the "continuous line" category which had not yet been constructed or
were in the process of construction. Laws 1875. c. 108, at 96 (self-incorporated corporations) ;
Laws 1883, c. 387, at 565 (any domestic corporation). In 1875, a supplemental and ap-
parently superfluous statute authorized the consolidation of eligible railroad corporations
with Pennsylvania railroad corporations, subject to Pennsylvania laws. Laws 1875, c. 256,
§§ 1, 2.
An example of earlier legislation authorizing the consolidation of individual railroad corpo-
rations is the 1853 statute permitting the consolidation of any or all of nine specified
corporations. N.Y. Laws 1853, c. 76, at 110.
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building corporations49 and domestic self-incorporated banking associa-
tions located in the same city, town or village.-" Eligible railroad cor-
porations were also permitted to consolidate with foreign corporations.
Uniformly, the consent of the holders of two thirds of all the stock of
each of the participating corporations was necessary to effect corporate
consolidations during this period, a requirement which was retained with-
out change until 1923.P' With the exception of the enabling legislation
affecting turnpike corporations, dissenting stockholders were given a re-
demption option. This has been a concomitant of most legislative grants
authorizing consolidation,'- and it is arguable that at least dissenting
stockholders in pre-existing corporations would be entitled to such an
option as a matter of constitutional right under the "contract" and due
process provisions of the federal constitution. 3
The power of combination by way of merger was seldom granted dur-
ing this period. Self-incorporated fire insurance stock companies were
the only business corporations authorized to enter into an outright
merger. - Railroad corporations in the relationship of lessor and lessee
were also permitted to merge through a novel stock exchange "install-
ment" plan. The plan authorized the lessee corporation to issue addi-
tional stock for the specific purpose of exchanging the newly issued stock
for that of the lessor corporation and, upon acquiring all the stock of the
latter corporation, a merger could be formally consummated at the instance
of the lessee corporation without further action by the stockholders of
either.a As early as 1851, self-incorporated telegraph companies were
49. N.Y. Laws 1373, c. 616, §§ 1, 2.
50. N.Y. Laws 18S2, c. 409, §§ 48-50.
51. In 1923, the consent requirement in the case of most corporations vas changed to
two-thirds of the voting stock. See text accompanying note 131 infra.
52. Cf. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ S7, 91 (7); N.Y. Insurance Law § 503.
53. This question has never been decided by the United States Supreme Court and, in
view of the prevalence of appraisal statutes at the present time, the court will probably never
have occasion to pass judgment on the question. State courts have held that there is no
constitutional requirement for redemption with respect to stockholders of participating corpo-
ratons organized after the enactment of the consolidation statute. Thompson v. Indiana Union
Traction Co., 133 Ind. 690, 110 N.E. 121 (1915); Mayfield v. Alton Railway, Gas & Elm.
Co., 193 Ill. 52S, 65 N.E. IOD (1902). It has also been held, however, that diasenting stock-
holders in participating corporations organized prior to the enactment of a merger !:tatute
have a constitutional right of redemption notwithstanding the state's reserved power to alter
and amend the corporate charter. Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858). For
a discussion of the scope and interpretation of various state appraisal statutes, see Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Har,. L. Rev. 233 (1931).
54. N.Y. Laws 1873, c. 616, §§ 1, 2.
55. N.Y. Laws 1867, c. 254, at 444; see pre-ent N.Y. Railroad Law, § 149. An intermediate
phase of this combination plan permitted directors of the lese corporation by their own
resolution to become, ex officio, the exclusive directors and managers of the lecor railroad
corporaton upon the lessee corporation's acquisition of the majority of the stock.
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expressly authorized to unite facilities and activities with any telegraph
corporation and, possibly, to combine organizations. 0
In no instance did the legislation authorizing merger afford dissenting
stockholders a redemption option.
IV. INTEGRATION OF NEW YORK STATUTORY
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
6
a
In 1890 an attempt was made to reformulate the major portion of the
statutory business corporation law of the state within the compass of five
general laws, namely: the General Corporation Law, the Stock Corpora-
tion Law, the Railroad Law, the Transportation Corporations Law, and
the Business Corporations Law.57 In 1892, due to inadequate and con-
flicting provisions, the General Corporation, Stock Corporation and Busi-
ness Corporations Laws 8 were redrafted with incidental or substantial
changes, and the Banking Law and Insurance Law were introduced for the
first time.59 In the course of the general revision of 1890 and 1892 all the
earlier general corporation acts, excepting the 1868 act for the incorpora-
tion of fishing companies to operate in the salt waters of Suffolk County"0
and the New York City Marketing Company Act of 187 1,01 were repealed.
Frequently, however, incidental provisions or major portions of some of
the pre-1890 statutes were literally or substantially incorporated into the
revised legislation.
In 1910 an official consolidation of all New York legislation was com-
pleted and the foregoing general corporation laws, as amended and
revised, became the definitive code of New York statutory business
corporation law."'
The power to acquire the stock of other business corporations by way of purchase or ex-
change of stock was granted only sparingly to New York business corporations prior to 1890.
See Freedland, History of Holding Company Legislation in New York State: Some Doubts
as to the "New Jersey First" Doctrine, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 372-77 (1955).
56. A telegraph company was authorized to extend its lines and "unite with any other
incorporated telegraph company" with the consent of the holders of two thirds of the stock
of the interested corporations. N.Y. Laws 1851, c. 98, at 178. The writer believes that the
more reasonable interpretation of the language in context indicates that the uniting refers to
a physical union of lines. The language, however, is susceptible of being construed as author-
izing combination. There are no decisions in point.
56a. This section is a virtual restatement of the writer's presentation in the Fordham Law
Review article, supra note 55.
57. See Appendix.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. N.Y. Laws 1868, c. 161, at 343. Repealed by Laws 1909, c. 4, § 25 (Business Corpora-
tions Law).
61. N.Y. Laws 1871, c. 820, at 1886. Repealed by Laws 1909, c. 4, § 25 (Business Corpo-
rations Law).
62. See Appendix.
[Vol. 25
MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION
With regard to the purview of the respective general corporation laws,
the Railroad Law, Insurance Law and Banking Law more or less speak
for themselves and require no further elucidation. The purview of the
other laws, not being as readily discernible from their titles, will be de-
scribed in greater detail.
The Transportation Corporations Law of 1890 applied to ferry, naviga-
tion, stage coach, tramway, pipe line, gas and electric light, water works,
telegraph and telephone, turnpike and bridge corporations.' In 1911,
the law was extended to freight terminal companies.04 In the course of
the general revision of 1926, district steam corporations were included
within the purview of the law but the provisions relating to navigation,
tramway, bridge and turnpike corporations were completely eliminated.P
By virtue of the same revision stage coach corporations were merged in
the new omnibus corporation classification
The Business Corporations Law of 1890 was of indeterminable scope
and applicable to types of business enterprises which could not be in-
corporated under other general corporation laws.' 7 In the 1892 revision,
the law was made specifically inapplicable to water companies serving or
located in New York Citys and a few years later was also made in-
applicable to moneyed and "transportation" corporations.0 Inasmuch as
the scope of the law had always been limited to accomplish the same re-
sult, the reason for such specific exceptions is not apparent. In 1924 the
law was virtually repealed and all but a few of its provisions were re-
enacted in other general laws." Since April 17, 1952, with the repeal and
redistribution of the two surviving sections,71 the law has had only his-
torical significance.
The General Corporation Law72 and Stock Corporation Law of 1890
and 1892 were the two general corporation laws which transected all
other business corporation laws and formed the residual estate of New
York business corporation law. In the event of conflict, provisions of
these laws were subordinate to the provisions of other general corporation
63. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 566, art. I-IL.
64. N.Y. Laws 1911, c. 778, at 2075.
65. N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 762, §§ 1, 2; now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law §§ 1, 2.
66. N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 762, § 60, now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law § Co.
67. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 567, § 1; Laws 1892, c. 691, § 1.
6S. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 691, § 16.
69. N.Y. Laws 1895, c. 671, § 1; Laws 1896, c. 460, at 428. "Transportation" corpora-
tions refer to enterprises incorporated under the Transportation Corporations Layw.
70. N.Y. Laws 1923, c. 787, § 134 (2). Only five sections (12-16) survived the repeal.
71. See N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 806, §§ 1, 3.
72. It is worthy of note that the 1892 version of the law marked the demie of the
general manufacturing (etc.) act of 1848, which, with its numerous amendments, was the
most important general corporation act of the pre-1S90 period. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 6W7, § 34
(repeal).
1956-571
FORDIHAM LAW REVIEW
laws.73 In all other corporate matters the General Corporation Law
(which has never become an incorporation statute) and the Stock Cor-
poration Law governed, and served to supplement and unify other exist-
ing statutory business corporation law.
The Stock Corporation Law was initially inapplicable to moneyed cor-
porations.7" In the 1892 revision the law was made only partially in-
applicable to such corporations. 5 Thirty-one years later the legislation
was made all inclusive in scope and extended "to any stock corporation
created under or by a general or special law, except as to matters for
which provision is made in any other corporate law."7 0 In the same year,
for the first time, the law became an incorporation statute.
There is one other general law which merits consideration in any study
relating to New York legislation of the post-1890 period authorizing
merger or consolidation. That is the Public Service (Commissions) Law
which, originally introduced in 1907 and initially applicable only to rail-
roads, street surface railroads and gas and electric companies, 77
eventually affected every corporation subject to the Railroad Law and
Transportation Corporations Law. 8
73. See N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 563, § 25; Laws 1890, c. 564, § 72; Laws 1892, c. 687, § 33.
74. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 564, § 1.
75. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 688, § 1. Article I, containing the general and reorganization
provisions of the law, was the only article which continued to be inapplicable. In 1909, this
article, as revised, was made partially applicable to moneyed corporations. However, the
applicable provisions of the revised article had previously been included in other articles of
the Stock Corporation Law.
76. N.Y. Laws 1924, c. 441, § 2.
77. N.Y. Laws 1907, c. 429, at 889. In 1910, the statute became chapter 48 of the Con-
solidated Laws without amendment. Laws 1910, c. 48, at 923. Among other things, the
Public Service Commission(s) ousted from jurisdiction and supplanted the board of railroad
commissioners, board of rapid transit commissioners and commission of gas and electricity.
These latter agencies were originally created by Laws 1882, c. 353, at 444; Laws 1891, c. 4,
§§ 1-3; Laws 1905, c. 737, at 2092.
78. The law was extended, in piecemeal fashion, to telegraph and telephone companies
(N.Y. Laws 1910, c. 673, § 3), steam corporations (Laws 1913, c. 505, § 3), omnibus
corporations (Laws 1931, c. 531, § 2), water works companies (Laws 1931, c. 715,
§ 3), motor carriers of freight (Laws 1938, c. 543, § 2). Cf. N.Y. Public Service Law,
art. 3-A, 3-B, 4-A, 4-B, 5. In 1921, the law was amended to provide for the establish-
ment of a transit commission which, in cities of more than one million population,
divested the Public Service Commission of jurisdiction over the activities of railroads. Laws
1921, c. 134, § 3. The transit commission, in turn, was subsequently relieved of most of Its
authority by the creation in 1924 of the board of transportation. Laws 1924, c. 573, § 1;
cf. present N.Y. Rapid Transit Law, art. I. In 1943, the transit commission was abolished
and two years later its former jurisdiction was formally assumed by the Public Service
Commission. Laws 1943, c. 170, § 1; Laws 1945, c. 855, § 6, now N.Y. Public Service Law
§ 5 (1). To some extent, the jurisdiction of the Commission over the activities of corpora-
tions operating surface transportation facilities in cities with more than one million popu-
lation has been curtailed. See Laws 1950, c. 163, at 687; Laws 1953, c. 618, at 1451;
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V. NEw YoK ENABLING LEGISLATION:
1890-19562
Aided materially by the early enactment of legislation authorizing the
intercorporate exchange of stock, the legal power of New York business
corporations to merge and consolidate underwent considerable expansion
during the post-1890 period. Unlike the historical development of the
power of intercorporate stockholding,80 however, the liberalization of the
power of combination was not marked by a sudden, radical change in
legislative policy at the very outset of the period. It was, rather, a
gradual evolutionary process, without noteworthy changes, which ex-
tended over many decades.
Notwithstanding the general tendency to constantly enlarge the power
of combination after 1890, there have always been significant limitations
upon the diversity of business activities which can be affected by any
proposed combination. Combination is still limited essentially to the
merger or consolidation of corporations organized under the same general
corporation law, the merger of title insurance companies with trust com-
panies and banks being the notable exception.81 The power of public
utility and moneyed corporations is even more particularly restricted
and, as recently as 1923, the power of "ordinary" commercial enterprises
to combine extended only to corporations engaged in the same or similar
business activities.
The most comprehensive enabling legislation of the period, from the
standpoint of scope of application, was enacted before 1900. This was the
pro forma merger provision of the Stock Corporation Law, which became
law in 1896. The provision, which was as insubstantial in substance as it
was comprehensive in application, authorized any domestic corporation
owning all the stock of any other domestic corporation "organized for or
engaged in business similar or incidental to that of the possessor corpora-
tion . . . to merge such other corporation" pursuant to a resolution by
the directors of the possessor corporation.- This power was later ex-
present N.Y. Public Service Law § 5-d. Since 1951, publicly owned and operated transit
facilities have not been subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission in any re-pect. Laws
1951, c. 401, at 1071, now N.Y. Public Service Law § 5-c. The present title, Public Service
Law, was adopted in 1930. Laws 1930, c. 782, § 3.
79. A chronological table of the general corporation lawis of this period is contained
in the Appendix. This period will sometimes be referred to as the "post-1S90" period.
SO. See Freedland, op. cit. supra note 55.
31. See N.Y. Insurance Law § 441. For other exceptions, see note 82 infra.
82. N.Y. Laws 1896, c. 932, § 1. The initial legislative deviation from the "similar or
incidental business" rule was the authorization to any railroad corporation, operating part
of its line over a bridge by contract arrangement, to merge with the corporation owning
the bridge. Laws 1900, c. 476, at 1151, now N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 85 (4). In 193S,
railroad corporations which legally substituted stages, buses or motor vehicles as the mode
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tended to permit merger between domestic and foreign corporations 3 but,
after 1936, the approval of the Public Service Commission was required
whenever the proposed merger involved a corporation under its juris-
diction.s" From 1925 to 1936, approval had been required whenever the
possessor corporation was under the jurisdiction of the Commission.8"
In 1936, the requisite stock ownership by the possessor corporation was
reduced to ninety-five per cent of each class of stock in the case of gas
companies, electric companies and gas and electric companies8 and, in
the following year, the reduction was applied to the holdings of these
corporations in district steam corporations.87 Since 1949, the reduction in
the prescribed holdings of the possessor corporation has been made
applicable to all corporations.88 After the consummation of a pro forma
merger, the possessor corporation enjoyed the same powers and privileges
it had possessed before the merger.
The 1896 statute was the initial legislation in New York State author-
izing a domestic business corporation to merge with a wholly-owned
domestic subsidiary corporation engaged or authorized to engage in sim-
ilar or incidental business activities, regardless of the nature of the
parent corporation's business.8 9 Its greater historical importance, how-
ever, probably stems from its unique status as the only legislation in the
history of the state to supplement the non-conflicting provisions of all
general corporation laws relating to combination. The necessity for en-
abling legislation to authorize a corporation to merge a wholly-owned
subsidiary corporation, engaged in the same kind of business, is also com-
pelling evidence of the statutory nature of the merger process. All
mergers between parent and subsidiary corporations, susceptible of con-
summation by directorate action on the part of the parent corporation,
will hereafter be referred to as pro forma mergers.
Other New York legislation authorizing combination, enacted in 1890
and succeeding years, has always had a more specific application-and
of conveyance on any part of their lines were permitted to merge with omnibus corporations,
subject to the approval of the Public Service Commission. Laws 1935, c. 398, at 930, now
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 85 (6).
83. In 1902, foreign corporations, authorized to do business in the state, were permitted
to absorb domestic corporations. N.Y. Laws 1902, c. 961, § 1. Subsequently, the power
was further extended to permit domestic corporations to absorb foreign corporations. Laws
1923, c. 787, § 85; cf. present N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 85 (1).
84. N.Y. Laws 1936, c. 778, § 2.
85. N.Y. Laws 1925, c. 649, § 2.
86. N.Y. Laws 1936, c. 778, § 1.
87. N.Y. Laws 1937, c. 815, at 1794.
88. N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 762, at 1707.
89. For the earlier power of railroad corporations in a parent-subsidiary, lessor-lessee
relationship, to merge on a similar basis, see text accompanying note 55 supra.
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considerably more substance-than the pro forna merger provision of
the Stock Corporation Law. It will be of advantage, therefore, to survey
the remaining enabling legislation of the post-1890 period with reference
to the types of business corporations affected, namely, moneyed corpora-
tions, railroad and other public utility corporations and other corporations:
A. Moneyed Corporationse0
1. Insurance Companies
In granting the power of combination to insurance corporations during
the post-1890 period, the New York legislature proceeded with great
caution. Whenever the power was granted, the approval of the Super-
intendent of Insurance as well as the consent of the holders of two thirds
of the stock of participating stock companies or the concurrence of a
prescribed percentage of the membership votes of mutual companies was
required. Moreover, mutual companies were denied the power completely
until 1927.
During the first decade of the period, domestic fire insurance stock
companies continued to be the only insurance corporations allowed to
combine.f' In 1901 title guaranty (title insurance) corporations were
permitted to merge with domestic trust companies as well as with other
domestic title guaranty corporationsP2 and, subsequently, were also
authorized to merge with domestic investment corporations (until 1938),
credit guaranty companies and commercial banks.02 In 1920, the legis-
90. The designation of corporations having banking powers, or having the power to
make loans upon pledges or deposits, or authorized by law to make insurances, as "moneyed
corporations" was introduced into the law as early as the Revised Statutes of 1827. N.Y.
Rev. Stat. 1827-28, pt. I, c. 18, tit. 11, § 51. In substance, the classification has been re-
tained to the present day. See N.Y. General Corporation Law § 3 (6).
91. Originally, the merger power of the preceding period (see text accompanying note S4
supra) and consent of two thirds of the stock were preserved, but the requisite number of con-
senting stockholders was reduced from sixty percent to fifty percent. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 690, §
129. In 1599, all domestic fire insurance stock corporations were authorized to merge or con-
solidate and the consent of a minimum number of stockholders was no longer required. Laws
1899, c. 165, § 1. Although the statute stated that the merger or consolidation would produce a
"new corporation," it is probable that, in the context of the legislation, a "newv corporation"
also comprehended a surviving corporation. The statutory language was used in the Insurance
Law for almost 40 years without benefit of or apparent necessity for judicial interpretation.
92. N.Y. Laws 1901, c. 677, § 2. The surviving corporation acquired all the rights and
privileges of the absorbed corporation. 1905 N.Y. Ops. Att'y Gen. 425; 1907 id. 503;
N.Y. Laws 1916, c. 345, § 1. Title guaranty companies were redenominated title insurance
companies in 1938. Laws 1938, c. 531, art. 3.
93. Merger with investment corporations was authorized in 1916 but the statute -,e-
cifically provided that the surviving corporation should be limited to its original rights and
privileges. N.Y. Laws 1916, c. 343, § 1. The power was terminated in 1938. Laws 1938, c.
531, § 1 (creating § 182 of Insurance Law). Mferger with credit guaranty companies and
commercial banks respectively, initially authorized in 1929 and 1938, was a by-product of
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lature granted the most substantial combination power accorded con-
temporary New York business corporations when it authorized merger
or consolidation by and between domestic and foreign fire insurance and
marine insurance stock corporations, provided the foreign corporation
was legally transacting business in New York State.04 In 1927, all mutual
insurance companies, other than fire insurance mutual companies, were
* allowed to combine. 5
Casualty insurance stock companies were first permitted to merge or
consolidate in 1929 and, from inception, their power extended to com-
bination with foreign corporations? Life and health insurance stock
companies were not allowed combination in any form until 1935, when the
merger and consolidation of domestic and foreign companies was author-
izedY7
Combination between stock and mutual insurance companies is still
prohibited but, since the 1939 revision of the Insurance Law, 8 all insur-
ance companies (other than cooperative fire and windstorm assessment
companies) have been permitted to merge or consolidate within their
type classifications on a nationwide basis, and title guaranty companies
the assumption of credit guaranty functions by title guaranty companies and commercial
banking functions by trust companies. Laws 1929, c. 290, § 3; Laws 1938, c. 531, § 1, now
N.Y. Insurance Law § 441.
94. N.Y. Laws 1920, c. 564, § 1. Originally, the foreign corporation was compelled to
change its domicile. In 1929, the domestic corporation was allowed to change its domicile
upon compliance with certain conditions. Laws 1929, c. 285, at 712.
Cf. Laws 1938, c. 691, at 1860, which permitted any domestic stock corporation, holding
all the stock of a fire or marine insurance company and authorized to carry on fire or marine
insurance activities, to merge or consolidate with such insurance company under certain
conditions and retain the name of the insurance company. This provision was not reenacted
in the 1939 revision.
95. N.Y. Laws 1927, c. 464, at 1149 (with consent of three fourths of members). The
combination power included both consolidation and merger. For a brief six-year period
prior to 1927, mutual employers liability and compensation companies bad been permitted
to merge or consolidate. Laws 1917, c. 299, § 1; Laws 1923, c. 812, § 9 (repeal).
96. Originally, in the event of combination with a foreign corporation, the latter was
required to change its domicile. N.Y. Laws 1929, c. 286, § 1. In the following year, the
domestic corporation was conditionally permitted to change its domicile. Laws 1930, c. 719,
at 1318.
97. N.Y. Laws 1935, c. 360, § 1. The domestic corporation was conditionally permitted to
change its domicile.
98. N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 882, §§ 389, 441, 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 488, 494, now N.Y.
Insurance Law §§ 390, 441, 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 488, 494. The types of insurance corpo-
rations in the 1939 revision were generally classified as follows: life, accident and health,
cooperative life and accident, casualty and surety, fire and marine, cooperative fire and
windstorm, life of property, title insurance. The consent requirement for mutual companies
was reduced to two thirds of the total membership votes. The combination of fire and
windstorm assessment companies was limited to those carrying on business in a common
intrastate territory.
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still retain their pre-1939 power to merge with trust companies and com-
mercial banks. More recently, pro Jorina merger was authorized between
trust companies and commercial banks possessing fiduciary powers and
wholly-owned subsidiary title insurance corporations.I
2. Banking Corporations
The legislative policy regarding the combining of corporations subject
to the Banking Law had a curious development during the post-1890
period. The Banking Law of 1892 originally retained the limited con-
solidation power of the 1882 act applicable to commercial banks'00 In
1895,1- this provision was repealed and statewide combination exclu-
sively by way of merger, applicable to all types of banking corporations
except savings banks,' - was substituted. Merger is still the exclusive
method of combination for all corporations subject to the Banking Law.
The 1895 merger provision remained substantially unchanged for
thirty-one years. In 1926, the legislature initiated the trend which led to
a marked contraction in the permissible geographical area within which
combination might be effected 0 3 and culminated in the universal elimina-
tion of statewide combination in the 1938 amendments to the Banking
Law."' However, the scope of permissible mergers, which originally had
been limited to merger between banking corporations of the same type,
was gradually extended to mergers between and among trust companies,
commercial banks and safe deposit companies":; and also to the merger
99. N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 579, at 1326, now N.Y. Insurance Law § 442. The approval of
the superintendent of banks was required. Parent title insurance companies were also given
the pro forma merger power.
100. N.Y. Laws 1892, c. 6S9, § 45 (within came village, city or town). Cf. Laws 1882, c.
409, §§ 48-50.
101. N.Y. Laws 1S95, c. 382, §§ 1, 2.
102. I.e., commercial banks, trust companies, building and mutual loan corporations, co-
operative savings and loan associations and safe deposit companies.
103. N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 81, at 240 (merger of national banks with state banks and
trust companies located within same county, city, town or village) ; Laws 1933, c. 328, § 2
(merger of savings and loan associaticns located within same county or borough in first
class cities and, elsewhere, within same or adjoining county).
104. N.Y. Laws 1938, c. 6S4, § 97, now N.Y. Banking Law § CD (1), (2), (3), (4).
With the exception of savings and loan associations and savings banks, the area was con-
fined to the same city or banking district. The merger of savings and loan as-ociations was
limited to associations located in the same or adjoining counties. For savings banks, see
note 109 infra.
105. The merg:ng of banks and trust companies was first authorized in 1923. N.Y.
Laws 1923, c. 8, § 1. See present N.Y. Banking Law § 6CO(). The merging of safe depoit
companies with commercial banks or trust companies was first authorized in 1942. Laws
1942, c. 233, at 838, now N.Y. Banking Law § 600(4).
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of title guaranty and now obsolete credit guaranty corporations with in-
vestment companies, trust companies and commercial banks. 10
In 1956, the pro forma merging of a subsidiary safe deposit company
into a parent commercial bank or trust company owning ninety-five per
cent of the outstanding shares of each class of its stock was authorized. 107
Consistent with the frequently evidenced legislative policy of dis-
couraging large savings banks,' these enterprises were not permitted to
combine until 1914 and then only within a very limited intrastate area.100
Since 1895, every combination of banking corporations has required
the approval of the Superintendent of Banks." 0 After 1932, personal
loan associations (companies) could avail themselves of the more liberal
provisions of the Stock Corporation Law governing combination."'
B. Railroad and Other Public Utility Corporations
The power of railroads to combine was substantially enlarged during
this period, principally through the enactment of three amendments to
the Railroad Law of 1890.
The 1890 statute integrated the provisions of pre-1890 legislation re-
lating to consolidation." In 1892, the legislature inaugurated the policy
of controlled monopoly in the railroad field and authorized the consolida-
tion of corporations owning competing and parallel lines, but, except in
106. N.Y. Laws 1901, c. 677, § 2 (trust companies and title guaranty companies). For
the further extension of the legislative authorization for the merging of banking and insur-
ance companies, see note 93 supra.
107. N.Y. Laws 1956, c. 39, § 1, now N.Y. Banking Law § 601(4). For other instances
of pro forma mergers between parent and subsidiary corporations, see text accompanying notes
55, 82-85 supra and 115 infra.
108. Note, for example, the current limitations upon the establishment of branches and
the maximum amount of individual deposits. N.Y. Banking Law §§ 240, 237. Maxima for
individual deposits were imposed upon savings banks in New York City and Kings County
as early as 1853 (Laws 1853, c. 257, § 5), twenty-two years before the first general act for
the incorporation of savings banks (Laws 1875, c. 371, at 404). Recent attempts to obtain a
very modest augmentation of the power to establish branches have proved unsuccessful. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1956, p. 39, col. 6.
109. Initially, the power was generally limited to the merger of savings banks located
within the same or adjoining counties but, as to savings banks located in first class cities,
was further limited to institutions within the same county or borough. N.Y. Laws 1914, c.
369, § 487(2). Subsequently, the latter limitation was applied to savings banks located in
cities with a minimum population of 250,000. Laws 1938, c. 684, § 97, now N.Y. Banking
Law § 600(2).
110. N.Y. Laws 1895, c. 382, § 1 (34),now N.Y. Banking Law § 601.
111. N.Y. Laws 1932, c. 399, § 3, now N.Y. Banking Law §§ 362-64. For earlier law,
see Laws 1914, c. 369, § 487(1), and pre-1932 amendments thereto.
112. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 565, §§ 70, 71; see present N.Y. Railroad Law §§ 140(1), 141.
The statute also referred to "merger" but only provided the procedural mechanism for con-
solidation.
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the case of street railroad corporations, the exercise of the power was
conditioned upon the approval of the regulatory agency having jurisdic-
tion." 3 In 1938, railroad corporations owning continuous lines were
authorized to merge."1 4 The 1867 law which empowered the lessee rail-
road corporation to absorb wholly-owned lessor corporations by action
of the directors was reenacted without substantive change and, except for
the subsequent additional requirement of official approval, remains un-
changed to date."3 Early in the period, the various combining powers
were extended to railroad corporations which carried on operations,
wholly or in part, in foreign countries."" After the enactment of the
Public Service Commissions Law in 1907, the combination of non-com-
peting as well as competing railroad corporations required the approval of
the Public Service Commission.1 7
Corporations organized under the Business Corporations Law prior to
January 1, 1917, which owned more than two thirds of the outstanding
stock of a domestic railroad corporation on that date, were given the un-
usual power of absorbing the railroad corporation and thereby becoming
a railroad corporation, subject to the approval of the Public Service Com-
mission and the consent of the holders of two thirds of the stock of the
surviving corporation.""
Domestic gas and electric light companies n ° and bridge and turnpike
corporations 2 " were the only corporations organized under the Trans-
portation Corporations Law which were authorized to combine prior to
1911. Thereafter, the combination of domestic freight terminal,12' water
113. N.Y. Laws 1S92, c. 676, § 80, now N.Y. Railroad Law § 150. See also Laws 1907,
c. 429, § 54; present Public Service Law § 54.
114. N.Y. Laws 193S, c. 630, §§ 1, 2, now N.Y. Railroad Law §§ 140(1), 141.
115. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 565, § 79, now N.Y. Railroad Law § 149.
116. N.Y. Laws 1895, c. 921, § 1; see N.Y. Railroad Law § 154.
117. N.Y. Laws 1907, c. 429, § 54, now N.Y. Public Service Law § 54; Consol. Laws
1910, c. 49, §§ 140(1), 141, 149, 150, 154, now N.Y. Railroad Law §§ 140(1), 141,
149, 150, 154.
118. N.Y. Laws 1917, c. 771, § 1, now N.Y. Railroad Law § 156.
119. The statute authorized consolidation. N.Y. Laws 1S90, c. 566, § 61(3). It was
ambiguous, however, with regard to the power of a gas company to consolidate with an
electric company. Cf. People v. Rice, 138 N.Y. 131, 33 N.E. 846 (1893); Young v. Roundout
& Kingston Gas Light Co., 129 N.Y. 57, 29 N.E. 83 (1891). The ambiguity was eliminated
and consolidation expressly authorized in the 1926 revision. Laws 1926, c. 762, § 11(4),
now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law § 11(4).
120. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 566, § 138. Consolidation of bridge corporations, turnpike corpo-
rations, and bridge and turnpike corporations, was authorized. The power was terminated
by the elimination of the bridge and turnpike classifications in the 1926 revision.
121. The power was originally limited to pro forma merger under the Stock Corporation
Law (see text accompanying note 82 supra) and consolidation with other domestic freight
corporations or other domestic corporations authorized to engage in such busine-s. In the event
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works'22 and telephones23 companies was also authorized. With the ex-
ception of pre-1926 consolidations involving bridge or turnpike cor-
porations, compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Business
Corporations Law or successor Stock Corporation Law' 4 was necessary
to effect the combination and, after 1907, the approval of the Public
Service Commission was also required.'25 At present, telegraph, omnibus,
ferry, pipe line and district steam corporations lack any power of com-
bination other than the power of pro forma merger conferred in the Stock
Corporation Law.
C. Other Corporations
The only power of combination provided in the Stock Corporation Law
prior to 1923, the year in which the statute became an incorporation law,
was the pro forma merger authorization described earlier in this study.12
Therefore, with the exception of pro forma merger, the combination pro-
visions of each general incorporation law since 1890 have been definitive
-there never having been a provision authorizing combination in the
General Corporation Law.
The incorporation statute, under which "industrial" or "ordinary"
business corporations (i.e., business corporations other than moneyed
and public utility corporations) were organized from 1890 to 1923, was
the Business Corporations Law. This statute made provision for the
consolidation of domestic "industrial" corporations "carrying on a busi-
ness of the same or a similar nature."' 27 The superseding provision of
of combination, the latter corporations were required to engage in the freight terminal business
exclusively. N.Y. Laws 1911, c. 778, § 1(157), now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law
§ 105.
122. N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 447, at 985, now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law § 47.
Merger and consolidation were expressly authorized.
123. N.Y. Laws 1950, c. 479, § 1, now N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law § 30-a.
Merger and consolidation were expressly authorized.
124. It is probable that the original consolidation power of domestic gas and electric
corporations and freight terminal corporations was enlarged to include the power of merger
(other than pro forma merger) in 1937 concurrently with the enlargement of the "con-
solidation" power in the Stock Corporation Law. N.Y. Laws 1937, c. 359, § 1, now N.Y. Stock
Corp. Law § 86. There are no decisions in point.
125. In addition to the requirement contained in the enabling legislation, the Public
Service (Commissions) Law has always required the approval of the commission prior to
the transfer or sale of the franchises, property or stock of "transportation" corporations.
N.Y. Laws 1907, c. 429, §§ 69, 70; Laws 1910, c. 673, § 3; Laws 1911, c. 778, § 1 (156), (157) ;
Laws 1931, c. 715, § 3; see present N.Y. Public Service Law §§ 69, 70, 99(2)t 100, 101, 89-f,
89-h; N.Y. Transportation Corporations Law §§ 103, 104.
126. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
127. N.Y. Laws 1890, c. 567, § 13; Laws 1892, c. 691, § 8; Laws 1923, c. 787, § 2 (re-
peal). As to what is meant by similar business activities, see Young v. Roundout &
Kingston Gas Light Co., 129 N.Y. 57, 29 N.E. 83 (1891); 1911 N.Y. Ops. Att'y Gen.
141; 1912 id. 33.
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the 1923 Stock Corporation Law was also limited to the consolidation of
domestic "industrial" corporations, 8 but, unlike its precursor, did not re-
quire the business of the constituent corporations to be of the same or a
similar nature. Eleven years later, consolidation with foreign "industrial"
corporations was authorized"-  and, in 1937, the combination power was
enlarged to authorize mergerYz° Since 1937, therefore, "ordinary" New
York business corporations have enjoyed the power to merge or con-
solidate their enterprises into a polyfunctional corporation through the
consensual agreement of their shareholders.
With the exception of pro forna mergers, every combination of New
York stock corporations from 1890 to 1923 required the consent of the
holders of two thirds of all the outstanding stock of each of the partici-
pating corporations. After 1923, in keeping with the "liberal" trend of
the 1920's to delegate substantial legislative authority to corporate pro-
moters and corporate managers, the consent of holders of designated
classes of stock in all corporations (other than post-1939 insurance com-
panies) could be dispensed with by the insertion of an appropriate
exclusionary provision in the certificate of incorporation or other certifi-
cate filed pursuant to law.' 31
128. N.Y. Laws 1923, c. 7S7, § 86: "Any two or more corporations, organized under the
laws of this state for the purpose of carrying on any kind of business which a corporation
organized under article two of this chapter might carry on may be consolidated into a
single corporation. . . 2' The newly formed corporation was expressly endowed with all
the powers of the constituent consolidating corporations. Id. § 33.
129. N.Y. Laws 1934, c. 611, § 1; see present N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 86, 83, 91.
130. N.Y. Laws 1937, c. 359, § 1, now N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 86.
"Any two or more domestic business corporations may be consolidated into a single corpo-
ration which may be either a new corporation or any one of the constituent corporations, by
the filing of a certificate ... but . . . no such certificate may confer on the consolidated
corporation any powers, rights, privileges or franchises which may not be exercised by a
corporation organized pursuant to article two of this chapter. . .
The merger power was created by permitting one of the participating corporations to
preserve its original corporate status. For the conformance of the pre-e'isting consolidation
power of foreign-domestic corporations to this provision, see Laws 1937, c. 359, § 6, novw
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 91.
131. N.Y. Laws 1923, c. 737, § 131, now N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 51; see also Laws
1951, c. 170, § 1. The legislation expressly provides, with immaterial exceptions, that "such
provisions of such certificate shall prevail, according to their tenor, in all elections and in all
proceedings, over the provisions of any statute which authorizes any action by the vote or
written consent of the holders of all the shares, or of a specified proportion of the shares
of the corporation."
In the writer's opinion, the language of section 435 of the current Insurance Law which
provides for stockholder consent, with "each stockholder to be entitled to one vote for
each share of stock held by him," would preclude the possibility of any stockholder of a
New York insurance company being deprived of his right to vote on a proposed merger or
consolidation affecting his company, the broad language of the Stock Corporation Law not-
withstanding. See N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 882, § 4S5, now N.Y. Insurance Law § 435. Ironically,
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At present, dissenting stockholders of any stock corporation partici-
pating in a consolidation are given a redemption option,3 2 but this situa-
tion did not prevail throughout the post-1890 period. Prior to the 1939
revision of the Insurance Law and the removal of turnpike and bridge
companies from the category of transportation corporations in 1926,
stockholders in insurance, turnpike and bridge corporations objecting to
a proposed consolidation had no statutory right to compel the corporation
to redeem their stock.
Not all dissenting stockholders of New York business corporations par-
ticipating in a present day merger are entitled to a redemption option.
Dissenting stockholders of any railroad corporation or banking corpora-
tion surviving a merger have not possessed this statutory right for some
time, the former since the initial railroad merger legislation of 19381"
and the latter since 1949.'1 Moreover, since 1953, similarly disposed
stockholders of any corporation surviving a merger consummated under
the authority of the Stock Corporation Law have enjoyed only a qualified
redemption option." 5 Although objecting stockholders of all merging
insurance companies may redeem their stock under current legislation,
this option was limited to stockholders of merging title guaranty corpora-
tions'"0 prior to 1939.
Combinations of domestic and foreign corporations have always been
subject to the legislative concurrence of the foreign jurisdiction.
VI. NE w YORK ENABLING LEGISLATION:
HISToRICAL MILESTONES
From the foregoing survey of general legislation authorizing the merger
and consolidation of New York business corporations, there emerge the
following milestones:
1. The earliest (general) legislation in New York State authorizing
the combining of two or more business corporations was enacted on April
the most "liberal" of all incorporating jurisdictions, the State of Delaware, requires the
consent of the holders of two thirds of all the "capital stock" of the participating corpo-
rations in order to effect a merger or consolidation. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1953).
For the legislative history of section 51 of the Stock Corporation Law, with particular
reference to its effect upon the voting rights of preferred stockholders in the event of
merger or consolidation, see Study and Recommendations of the New York Law Revision
Commission, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1951).
132. N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 85(7), 87, 91(7); Railroad Law § 161; Banking Law
§ 604; Insurance Law §§ 390, 503. Dissenting stockholders of transportation corporations are
afforded the option through the application of pertinent provisions of the Stock Corporation
Law.
133. N.Y. Laws 1938, c. 630, § 5, now N.Y. Railroad Law § 161.
134. N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 669, at 1536, now N.Y. Banking Law § 604.
135. N.Y. Laws 1953, c. 588, §§ 1, 2, now N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 87, 97(7).
136. For pre-1939 merger authority of title insurance (title guaranty) corporations, see
text accompanying notes 92, 93, 99 supra.
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6, 1849, when the consolidation of self-incorporated turnpike corpora-
tions was authorized..
2. The earliest legislation in the state authorizing the merger of busi-
ness corporations was the act of April 3, 1867, which authorized merger
between parent and wholly-owned subsidiary railroad corporations by
directorate action on the part of the parent corporation (i.e., pro forma
merger) whenever the corporations were also in a lessee-lessor relation-
ship.
3. The first statute authorizing the merger of business corporations,
other than pro forma merger, was enacted in 1873 and applied to self-
incorporated fire insurance stock corporations.
4. The first statute authorizing combination with foreign corporations
was the 1869 consolidation grant to non-competing railroad corporations
having continuous lines.
5. The most important legislation authorizing combination prior to the
1890 and 1892 general revisions of New York corporate law was the 1867
statute authorizing the consolidation of corporations with the same or
similar objects, organized under the General Manufacturing Act of 1948,
as amended, to carry on one kind of authorized business activity.
6. The most important legislation of the early post-1890 period was
the 1896 amendment of the Stock Corporation Law authorizing pro forma
merger between all parent corporations and wholly-owned subsidiary
corporations engaged in business similar or incidental to that of the
parent corporation. Subsequently, this authorization was extended to par-
ent corporations owning only ninety-five per cent of each class of stock
of the subsidiary corporation.
7. The broadest combination power ever granted in the state is found
in the current provisions of the Stock Corporation Law, originally enacted
in 1934, which authorize the merger or consolidation of any "ordinary"
or "industrial" corporation (i.e., any corporation other than a moneyed or
public utility corporation) with any other domestic or foreign "ordinary"
or "industrial" corporation.
8. The most restrictive legislative policy ever adopted in the state re-
garding corporate combinations, which confines the combination of bank-
ing corporations to the merger of corporations located within a very
limited geographical area, was first adopted in 1926 and is still in effect.
Savings banks were completely denied the power to merge or consolidate
until 1914.
9. Telegraph, omnibus, ferry, pipe line, and district steam corporations
are still unable to consolidate and, with the exception of pro forma mer-
gers authorized in the Stock Corporation Law, are also unable to merge.
10. Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, every merger and
consolidation affecting banking corporations or insurance corporations
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has required the respective approval of the Superintendent of Banks or
Superintendent of Insurance and, after the establishment of the Public
Service Commission in 1907, combinations affecting railroads or other
public utility corporations have also required official approval.
11. There appears to be a modern legislative tendency to eliminate or
curtail the redemption option of stockholders of corporations surviving
the merger process, as evidenced in the 1938 merger provisions of the
Railroad Law, the 1949 amendment of the Banking Law and the 1953
amendment of the Stock 'Corporation Law.
ADDENDUM
During the past several decades, there has been an increasing interest
in the continuing growth of very large corporate enterprises in the United
States, a phenomenon frequently referred to as "corporate bigness."
Under existing state and federal laws, there seems to be no reason why
any "well behaved" business corporation cannot continue to expand its
assets indefinitely through internal growth-apparently an inevitable
process insofar as most of our very large business corporations are con-
cerned. Neither antitrust legislation nor other laws are designed to arrest
such growth.
The growth of individual corporate enterprises by external expansion
through mergers, consolidations and acquisitions of all the stock or assets
of other business corporations is circumscribed to some extent by anti-
trust laws and other legislation whenever an insurance, banking or public
utility corporation is involved or it is judicially determined that competi-
tion may be unduly affected. The growth of individual "industrial" cor-
porations, however, through mergers, consolidations and acquisitions
involving other "industrial" corporations engaged in productively unre-
lated activities, is currently neither subject to legislative control by Con-
gress nor effective control by any state legislature.
It is more than an academic possibility that, at some future date, the
tendency to concentrate the bulk of the nation's corporate wealth, busi-
ness activities (and concomitant economic power) in fewer, larger and
ever growing individual corporate enterprises will be determined to be
contrary to public policy and a proper subject for governmental regula-
tion. It is submitted that the antitrust approach to regulation would be
inadequate for the purpose and would be completely inappropriate as well
as inadequate in the regulation of corporate growth achieved through the
medium of conglomerate corporate combinations and acquisitions.
In the course of implementing any prospective regulatory policy, there-
fore, Congress may decide to deprive all industrial corporations of the
power to enter into conglomerate mergers and consolidations. Whatever
the merits of such congressional action, the record should show that the
resulting situation would not be a novel development in our nation's
economic history.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS,
NEW YORK: 1890-1956'
Page Ch Laws 1S90190
1060 563 1S90 General Corporation Law!
1066 564 1890 Stock Corporation Law!
10S2 565 1890 Railroad Law.
1136 566 1890 Transportation Corporations Law.
1167 567 1890 Business Corporations Law.3
3 4 1891 Rapid Transit Railway Act (applicable to cities with over 1,M0,00
population) .
1800 687 1892 General Corporation Law.
1824 688 1892 Stock Corporation Law.
1842 689 1892 Bank:ng Law.
1930 690 1892 Insurance Law.
2042 691 1892 Business Corporations Law.
165 326 1895 Personal Loan Associations Act
CONSOLIDATED LAWS0
Page Ch Laws Consol. Laws 1909-1910
13 10 1909 (c.2) Banking Law.
13 12 1909 (c.4) Business Corporations Law.
13 28 1909 (c.23) General Corporation Law.
16 33 1909 (c.28) Insurance Law.
20 61 1909 (c.59) Stock Corporation Law.7
345 219 1909 (c.63) Transportation Corporations Law.
923 481 1910 (c.49) Railroad Law.
1911-1956
1239 369 1914 (c.2) Banking Law.
1377 787 1923 (c.59) Stock Corporation Law.
1410 762 1926 (c.63) Transportation Corporations Law.
121 650 1929 (c.23) General Corporation Law
2530 882 1939 (c.28) Insurance Law.
176S 800 1941 (c.4S-a) Rap'd Transit Law.
1. Intervening or superseding amendments or repeals of insubstantial parts of a statute
will not be reported in this chronology.
2. Except as otherwise indicated, all the general corporation laws in force at the dose
of the year 1903 were repealed in the 1909 consolidation and, with or without revision, be-
came part of the Consolidated Laws. The Railroad Law was not repealed or so intcgratcd
until 1910.
3. Amended and superseded in 1892 by law bearing same title.
4. Continued as an unconsolidated law until 1941.
5. Consolidated into the Banking Law in 1909.
6. With the exception of the Business Corporations Law and Railroad Law, all the original
consolidated laws subsequently underwent general revision and were expressly or practically
superseded. The Business Corporations Law was virtually repealed by N.Y. Laws 19273,
c. 787, § 2, only five sections being preserved. Shortly thereafter three of theze sections were
repealed and, in 1952, the repeal of the law was finally effected upon the repeal and re-
distribution of the two surviving sections. See Laws 1926, c. 762, § 2; Laws 1932, c. 805,
§§ 1, 3.
7. Did not become an incorporation statute until 1923.
